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Abstract
Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation—for instance, to one child per person or one 
child per couple—in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the 
claim that population size is a matter of justice, by explaining that we have a duty of justice towards the 
current generation of children to pass on to them a sustainable population. But instead of, or, more likely, 
alongside with, having fewer children in in each family, we could also create families with more than two 
parents. I explore this possibility by pointing out the ways in which multi-parenting can advance children’s 
interests: in higher levels of well-being, in non-monopolistic child-rearing, and in a future opportunity to 
become themselves parents.
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Introduction
Many believe it is imperative to limit population growth worldwide in order to prevent 
or mitigate the harmful effects of excessive consumption. At the same time, many believe 
that denying people the opportunity to parent amounts to a grave injustice, at least in 
cases when the individuals in question would make good (enough) parents and give 
their children reasonably flourishing lives. This paper is written for the subset of people 
who subscribe to (some version of) both beliefs—a subset that, I contend, is not small.
Usually, the two beliefs above are taken to support different, and incompatible, views 
concerning procreation and parenthood. On the one hand, there is the view that we 
ought to drastically limit procreation. Some philosophers argue that procreation is on 
par with consumption;1 indeed, recent empirical research indicates that procreation is 
disproportionately related to one’s carbon footprint.2 In this vein, some defend the claim 
that individuals lack a moral right to parent more than one child,3 while others argue 
that although individuals don’t have a duty to limit themselves to having small families, 
there is nevertheless a strong moral presumption in favor of doing so.4  
On the other hand, there is the view that there cannot be any legitimate restrictions—not 
even moral, and even less legal—on procreation. This, I take it, is the view supported by 
common morality and legislation alike. International legislation codifies an individual 
right to decide the number of children one has: The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights proclaims a right, for adults, to marry and found a family—that is, to procreate 
and raise children. The Proclamation of Teheran states that “parents have a basic human 
right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children.” 
Similarly, The Cairo Programme of Action recommends that governments prioritize 
1  Starting with Thomas Young, “Overconsumption and Procreation: Are They Morally Equivalent?” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 18, part 2 (2001): 183–92.
2  See Seth Wynes and Kimberly A. Nicholas, “The Climate Mitigation Gap: Education and Government 
Recommendations Miss the Most Effective Individual Actions.” Environmental Research Letters 12, no. 7 
(2017): 074024.
3  Christine Overall, Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012); Sara 
Conly, One Child: Do We Have a Right to More? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Tim Meijers, 
“Climate Change and the Right to One Child,” in Human Rights and Sustainability, ed. Gerhard Bos and 
Marcus Duwell (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), 181–94.
4 Travis Rieder, Towards a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Change Are Affecting the 
Morality of Procreation. (New York: Springer, 2016).
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individuals’ reproductive freedoms over demographic targets.5 Further, to the best of 
my knowledge, almost no legislation directly limits the number of children one can 
parent. (As I elaborate below, there are indirect limitations on the moral right to parent, 
having to do with ensuring a standard of sufficient well-being to children, meaning that, 
in practice, there is a limit to how many children one can permissibly bring up.) The 
notorious exception to this is the Chinese state, which for decades has implemented a 
law limiting the right to rear to one child, but this policy has been justified by appeal to 
considerations of internal Chinese politics rather than by appeal to the aim of avoiding 
worldwide overpopulation.
My contribution to the debate about procreation in an overpopulated world is to show 
that both beliefs—that we are near the point where world population is unsustainable 
and that we ought to respect and protect adults’ interest in parenting—will, when 
supplemented by a distributive concern, support the same practical conclusion: each 
generation has a duty of justice to limit its birth rates such that all those who wish to 
parent—and who would be able to do so adequately—can do so without restricting the 
same ability for those in generations to come. Depending on particular circumstances, 
this will entail a more or less drastic reduction in procreation. 
The focus of my discussion will be on how it is possible to satisfy the interest in parenting 
in cases in which justice requires a steep downsizing of the population. I argue that 
multiparenting—that is, three, four, or possibly more adults co-raising the same child 
or children—is a desirable solution. Moreover, in cases where each individual or couple 
parenting one child would not result in sufficiently steep downsizing, multiparenting 
may be morally required. In such circumstances, the moral duty to transition to 
multiparenting is owed to children qua future adults, because it protects their own 
interest in legitimate parenting; it is also one (possibly the best) way to discharge a 
duty to rear children in ways that minimize monopolies of care over them. Therefore, a 
legal reform would also be, in principle and under particular circumstances that I shall 
specify, justified. But such a reform faces serious implementation issues. The legal status 
of multiparenting ought to depend on whether there are permissible ways to enforce 
such a policy. This turns on answers to other questions, which I will flag at the end of 
the paper without aiming to answer them.
5 See United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, available at: http://www.un.org/en/
universal-declaration-human-rights/; United Nations, The Proclamation of Teheran, 1968, available at: 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/l2ptichr.htm; United Nations, Programme of Action, adopted at The 
International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 1994, available at: https://www.unfpa.
org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/programme_of_action_Web%20ENGLISH.pdf.
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A few further clarifications: I reserve the term parenting to talk about child-rearing. Most 
parenting is procreative parenting—that is, procreators rearing their children—but, as 
we shall see, procreation and parenting have different normative standing. Unqualified, 
“right” refers to moral rights.
Drawing on previous work, I explain in the next section why people who would make 
adequate parents have a morally weighty interest in an opportunity to parent and 
why this entails principled limits to how many children it is permissible to bring into 
existence during any period of time—I refer, by stipulation, to “generations.” The third 
section explains how multiparenting can be good for children relative to the status quo 
in which children have at most two parents. In addition, multiparenting is one way to 
dismantle a monopoly of care over children which, as I have argued elsewhere, is morally 
objectionable in itself. Further, multiparenting distributes fairly opportunities to fulfill 
the interest in close, long-lasting, and protected relationships with children. In the fourth 
section I elaborate on the circumstances in which multiparenting is morally required, 
and in the fifth section I address a few worries concerning multiparenting as a possible 
default way of raising children, including implementation difficulties.
Parenting and Overpopulation
As noted already, legislations and common-sense morality grant a right to unlimited 
procreation. Yet the right cannot be unqualified: to permissibly bring someone into 
existence, procreators must at least give their offspring lives worth living.6 But, more 
likely, procreators are to be held to higher moral standards, requiring them to provide at 
least adequate lives for the children they bring into the world7—at least, assuming that 
nobody else capable of adequate parenting is willing to raise these children. Here I don’t 
commit to a particular standard of permissible procreation.
But why are adults who can meet the relevant standard free to beget and raise children? On 
a traditional view, this is by virtue of other generally recognized rights. As a human right 
proclaimed by international documents, the right to parent—conflating reproduction 
and child-rearing—is justifiable by appeal to the right to bodily autonomy and rights 
6  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
7 See Onora O’Neill, “Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing,” in Having Children: Philosophical and Legal 
Reflections on Parenthood, ed. Onora O’Neill and William Ruddick (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 25–38; and David Archard, “The Obligations and Responsibilities of Parenthood,” in 
Procreation and Parenthood, ed. David Archard and David Benatar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 103–27.
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that protect individuals’ freedom to form and maintain intimate relationships. The likely 
normative story behind this understanding of the right to parent goes like this: adults 
have a right to do as they please with their bodies, as long as they do not inflict harm 
on others; hence, they should not in general be prevented from engaging in consensual 
sexual activities, from which children may result. Causal responsibility for the existence 
of these children then results in moral responsibility for the children’s welfare. This is 
the causal account of parental rights and duties: procreative parents owe duties to their 
children and, in order to be able to discharge these duties properly, they have a right 
to parent. The right to parent, thus understood, is a right to be free from third parties’ 
interference with one’s procreative and child-rearing activities. If understood as an 
interest-protecting right, it protects the interests in bodily autonomy, association, and 
ability to discharge one’s duties. It is not necessarily a sui generis right because it does not 
rely directly on a fundamental interest to parent. In very impoverished circumstances, 
the unlimited exercise of procreative powers can to result in a large number of children, 
some of whom will inevitably come to harm.8 Our rights to use our bodies as we 
wish, and to associate with others, are conditional on our not harming third parties. 
In conditions of severe scarcity, an increasing number of people shall cease having a 
right to procreate as understood in this traditional way—namely, all those lacking the 
resources to ensure the flourishing of their offspring.9 If so, a right to bodily autonomy 
and free association are unstable grounds for a right to parent. A universally held right 
to procreate ceases to exist if and when further procreation puts enough individuals at 
high risk of misery—whether “misery” is understood (depending on the correct theory 
of permissible procreation) as having a life not worth living or as “mere” insufficiency.
Yet there is another account of the right to parent, one that I argue is not as immediately 
vulnerable to objections pointing to imminent world overpopulation. Recently, several 
philosophers defended a way to understand parenting that amounts to a sui generis 
8 That is, whether harming one’s offspring is defined here as having a life below the threshold that makes 
it worth living or merely an insufficiently good childhood.
9 Here I present two important observations: (1) It is plausible that privately owned resources are not 
enough to ensure sufficiently good lives; for this, one also needs to live in societies that provide various 
collective goods, including just, or at least decent, institutions and peace. These goods may be the first to 
be eroded in cases of extreme climate events and, relatedly, increased scarcity. (2) Depending on who has 
the duty to shoulder the costs of children—parents alone or parents and nonparents together—it may be 
the case that in such circumstances nobody would have a right to procreate and parent that is derivative 
from a right to bodily autonomy and freedom of association. On the question of who should pay for the 
costs of children, see Serena Olsaretti, “The Costs of Rearing Children,” in The Routledge Handbook of 
the Philosophy of Childhood and Children, ed. Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder, and Jurgen De Wispelaere 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018), 339–50.
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right. According to this account, the most elaborate version of which was developed by 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift,10 being able to parent is a good that can greatly enrich 
people’s lives, the loss of which cannot be compensated easily, if at all. For these reasons, 
denying would-be adequate parents an opportunity to parent may present an injustice.11 
Brighouse and Swift defend a right to parent that has several important characteristics. 
First, it is grounded simultaneously in children’s interest in having adequate parents and 
in would-be parents’ interest in being the ones serving the children’s interest. Since the 
parents’ interest is to be the person in charge with satisfying the children’s interest, it is the 
latter interest that is most fundamental; this is why the right to parent is conditional on the 
parenting ability of the right-holder. Second, it is an interest-protecting right; this is why, 
if the interest cannot be fulfilled for whatever reason—say, due to universal infertility—
this significantly sets back the flourishing of the individuals who have the interest and, as 
such, raises a serious moral concern. Third, the relevant interest is in the unique goods 
generated by the combination of two features of parenting: the unparalleled intimate and 
trustful quality of the parent-child relationship on the one hand, and on the other hand 
the fact that it gives adults the opportunity to live up to the moral challenge of being a 
good parent, and thus a path to unique self-knowledge and personal growth. Both sets 
of features are present in adoptive as well as in procreative parenthood; Brighouse and 
Swift’s is an account of why some people have a right to parent, but not necessarily a right 
to procreate, or indeed a right to rear the children they procreate.
I find the Brighouse-Swift account persuasive, although with a twist (as I have argued 
elsewhere12): I think that the interest in child-rearing lies mostly in having a long-term, 
caring relationship with a child, one that is immune to arbitrary interference from third 
parties. That is, most if not all of what makes the interest in parenting so weighty concerns 
the goods that accrue to people in virtue of their spending substantial periods of time 
with a child whom they love, who loves them back and for whom they are beneficial. 
Someone whose relationship with a child has these characteristics, and who cannot be 
separated from the child against her will, can enjoy the unique intimacy and spontaneity 
10 In Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of the Parent-Child Relationship 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
11 Other philosophers who hold this view, while disagreeing with Brighouse and Swift over many issues 
concerning the right to parent, are Colin MacLeod, “Conceptions of Parental Autonomy,” Politics and 
Society 25, no. 1 (1997): 117–40; Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); and Liam Shields, “Parental Rights and the Importance of Being 
Parents,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (2016). https://doi.org/10.108
0/13698230.2016.1262316.
12  Anca Gheaus, “Is There a Right to Parent?” Law, Ethics, and Philosophy, no. 3 (2015): 193–204.
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of loving a child. They can also enjoy the special responsibility of having a significant 
impact on a child’s present and future—and with this responsibility, the self-knowledge 
and personal growth that are part and parcel of good parenting. This is because adults 
who are emotionally close to children over a long time make a strong impact on their 
children’s personality even when they lack the decision-making power of a parent. Think, 
for instance, of closely involved grandparents, long-term nannies, and other de facto 
child-rearers who become parental figures. This twist on the Brighouse-Swift account 
is significant to the present discussion because it indicates that the satisfaction of the 
morally relevant interest in bringing up children does not require a freedom to bring up 
one’s child all by oneself, but is compatible with a few adults sharing the rearing of the 
same child.
If the interest in rearing children that is the cornerstone of this account is powerful 
enough to generate a right,13 then it is plausible that adequate parents will have a duty 
to do their best to ensure that their children, too, will be able to raise children if they 
wish to. This is, in a concise form, an argument that I have defended in previous work:14 
Since only adequate parents have the right to raise children, according to this theory, 
today’s parents ought to ensure that they pass on to their children enough resources 
such that the latter will also have access to legitimate parenting. But to justly raise these 
prospective children, today’s children will also need to be able to give their children 
sufficient resources to make it possible for them to engage in legitimate parenting, if 
they should wish to do so. And so on—this argument continues ad infinitum because it 
relies on the recurrent premise that the resources needed by one individual to justly raise 
children include the resources needed to provide one’s children with enough resources 
to justly raise their own children. The premise can be reiterated for any number of future 
generations.
Let me put this more intuitively. Assume that, foreseeably and avoidably, a generation 
(G1) left behind a world so impoverished or dangerous that its own children (G2) would 
not be in a position to parent justly, because they (G2) couldn’t be sufficiently confident 
that their own children (G3) would have an adequate life. G1 would obviously wrong 
13 This appears to be well supported by empirical evidence. Consider, for instance, that many people are 
willing to spend enormous amounts of time, money, and energy in order to be in the position to rear a 
child. Note that the interest is not said to be universal: there are alternative ways of leading a flourishing 
life that are not compatible with being an adequate parent.
14 Anca Gheaus, “The Right to Parent and Duties Concerning Future Generations,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 24, no. 4 (2016): 487–508. Another philosopher who believes that appeal to parents’ 
interests can serve as grounds for wanting to limit the population is Sarah Hannan. See her “Parent-
Centered Reasons to Have Fewer Children” (unpublished manuscript; last modified in June 2013).
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their children: even if the life of people in G2 would otherwise go well, people in G1 
would deprive people in G2 of the opportunity to bring up children, an opportunity that 
people in G1 enjoy—and this is unjust. Now assume that G1 you were to leave behind 
(again, avoidably) a world that will become too impoverished or dangerous for child-
rearing only a generation later. In this case, people from G2 could proceed with having 
children, but only in the knowledge that people in G3 would not have an opportunity 
to engage in permissible parenting. People in G1 effectively impose on their children 
a choice between bringing up children who would be deprived of the opportunity to 
parent—an opportunity that people in G1 and G2 enjoy—or else to forgo parenting 
entirely. This is a choice that is unjust to impose on one’s children if one can avoid doing 
it at reasonable cost to oneself.
The conclusion is that each generation of parents acts unjustly toward their own 
children if they fail to leave to these children a world in which they, too, can bring up 
children permissibly. Given the conditions on permissible parenting—that children have 
adequate lives, including opportunities to satisfy their weighty interests—this amounts 
to a requirement of sustainability.
Sustainability itself depends on three factors: affluence (that is, level of consumption), 
technology, and population.15 It may be the case that, with enough technological progress 
and/or with much lower consumption, it would be possible to sustain a population much 
larger than the current one at an adequate quality of life. If so, the current preoccupation 
with reducing population growth (or advocating population de-growth) imminently 
may be overshooting the target.
Yet there are several reasons to be skeptical of this response, and to want to direct some 
efforts into limiting the future population. These are reasons that should also speak 
to those who endorse the first, traditional, view of the right to parent that I sketched 
above. But if the Brighouse-Swift account of the right to parent—or something like it—is 
correct, and if my view about what it entails for justice concerning future generations is 
correct, these reasons are particularly compelling and urgent.
 A first consideration is that low-consuming populations from poor parts of the world 
aspire to higher levels of affluence—and legitimately so, especially as long as people in 
the rich parts of the world fail to scale down their own consumption. As affluence in at 
least some of the traditionally poor, and also highly populated, parts of the world raises 
quickly, so do levels of worldwide consumption.
15  Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 1968.
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Another consideration is that new technologies,16 and especially geoengineering—
which could help most against climate change effects, if it works—carry very significant 
risks.17 If actualized, such risks would be devastating. This explains why some scientists 
believe that it is imperative to reduce CO2 emissions in order to keep global warming 
at a minimum.18 It is in this context that one can best appreciate the relevance of 
how procreative decisions have an impact on CO2 emissions: research indicates that 
procreating even one child contributes many dozens of times more to limiting CO2 
emissions than living car-free, avoiding plane travel, or eating a plant-based diet.19 
This is not to endorse the claim that procreating is morally on a par with overconsumption. 
Having a certain, minimum, number of children seems to be morally required,20 while 
most if not all other high consumption choices are morally optional. Besides, it appears 
flawed to say that, morally speaking, choosing to have one more child is consumption 
in the same way as, say, flying, because it is not the parent but the child who will make 
most consumption decisions concerning him- or herself. But even if procreation is not 
on par with consumption, the underlying normative problem remains: as a procreator, 
one is morally responsible for the bringing into existence of another individual with 
his or her own claims to resources. If one of these claims is to have enough to raise her 
own children adequately, as I argued above, then each procreative choice generates a 
potentially unlimited stream of future individuals with consumption entitlements.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to investigate legitimate ways of limiting the 
population is this: accelerated global warming is already happening, and even the most 
optimistic projections indicate that we are likely to face climate events that will as such 
reduce the pool of existing resources and cause significant migration from the poorer 
16  For more discussion about the risks of relying too much on technological improvement in the fight 
against climate change, see Colin Hickey, Travis N. Rieder, and Jake Earl, “Population Engineering and 
the Fight against Climate Change,” Social Theory and Practice 42, no. 4 (2016): 845–70.
17  Vera Heck et al., “Biomass-Based Negative Emissions Difficult to Reconcile with Planetary 
Boundaries,” Nature Climate Change 8 (2018): 151–55. http://nature.com/articles/doi:10.1038/s41558-
017-0064-y; Christopher C. Trisos et al. “Potentially Dangerous Consequences for Biodiversity of 
Solar Geoengineering Implementation and Termination,” Nature Ecology and Evolution, no. 2 (2018): 
475–82. http://nature.com/articles/doi:10.1038/s41559-017-0431-0.
18  Heck, “Biomass-Based Negative Emissions.” 
19 Wynes and Nicholas, “The Climate Mitigation Gap.” 
20 I have argued for this in Anca Gheaus, “Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?” In 
Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting, ed. Sarah Hannan, Samatha Brennan, 
and Richard Vernon (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 87–106.
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(or simply harder hit) regions of the world to the richer ones. So, even if the world as 
it is now could indeed sustain a population much larger than the current one at an 
adequate quality of life, it is not clear that this will still be the case in a few decades, when 
climate change events may have destroyed many of the world’s resources. And even if 
rich countries today are not overpopulated, it is far from clear that they can permissibly 
remain so in the near to medium term.21
Multiparenting: Good, Anti-monopolistic and Fair
What are the implications of the reasoning above for permissible parenting under 
conditions of increasing scarcity? My argument indicates that each generation owes 
its own children a sustainable world by virtue of the moral importance of satisfying 
their interest in legitimate parenting. Stated like this, the claim does not fully specify the 
bearers of the duty. This is intentional: in one view, we all collectively bear duties toward 
children; in a different one, procreators alone are the primary duty-bearers in relation 
to their offspring, and third parties have backup, or remedial, duties in case procreators 
fail to live up to theirs.22 I do not commit to any of these views here because, whichever 
is correct, justice toward children requires some limiting of procreation and, hence, of 
child-rearing.23
What if the population is already too large for our, or our children’s, generation to procreate 
at the replacement rate in a sustainable way? In that case, our—or our children’s—
generation can live up to its duty toward the next generation if either some individuals 
allow their interest in parenting go unfulfilled, or else if all adequate prospective parents 
cooperate with other individuals by coparenting, such that everybody’s interest in 
parenting is fulfilled. 
The first possibility is a sacrifice that cannot be legitimately demanded of individuals 
21 For instance, The World Bank has recently published a report saying that up to 143 million people 
may have to migrate by 2015 due to climate change. See Jocelyn Timperley, “Expect Tens of Millions of 
Internal Climate Migrants by 2050, Says World Bank,” Eco-Business, March 20, 2018. https://www.eco-
business.com/news/expect-tens-of-millions-of-internal-climate-migrants-by-2050-says-world-bank/.
22  See Olsaretti, “The Costs of Rearing Children.”
23 In this case, I assume, the relationship between the collective duty and the individual duties is the 
same as in the case of other scarce goods, opportunities to which should be distributed equally: if justice 
requires population reduction, such that not all individuals may parent alone, then it makes sense to talk 
about one’s fair share of parenting. It is a difficult but general question whether individuals have a duty 
to refrain from appropriating more than their fair share in cases when there is no regulation specifying 
what that share is exactly and demanding individuals not to exceed it.
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as long as an alternative, more fair solution exists, and individuals prefer this solution 
over remaining childless. To discharge the duty to pass on a sustainable world to the 
next generation, individuals who live in such circumstances ought to be ready to share 
child-rearing with several other adults—that is, to multiparent. Multiparenting is 
parenting of the same child or children by more than two parents—typically three or 
four. (Alternatively, ideal forms of multiparenting could include more adults bringing up 
several children, in case that having whole generations of single children is undesirable. 
I will not analyze this more complicated form of multiparenting here.)
The very few existing philosophical engagements with multiparenting have so far 
discussed cases of more than two adults wanting to parent the same child—and most 
often, wanting to legalize a de facto situation of multiparenting.24 The practice is legally 
accepted in some countries, such as Canada and New Zealand, that confer the status 
of parent on all adults who raise the child.  Attempts to make multiparenting a legally 
accepted form of child-rearing were initially motivated by the desire to protect already 
established caring relationships between a child and three or more adults.25 Many 
such cases include same-sex families whose children are raised in common by the two 
biological parents, one of whom is part of the same-sex couple and the third a sperm 
donor or a surrogate mother. Other multiparent families consist of the child or children’s 
legal parents who have at some point divorced, and their new partners. But, in some 
cases, legal multiparenting concerns the raising of children who are not yet attached 
to the (would-be) third or fourth parent because the child has not yet been conceived 
or born, but the adults who want to be involved have already applied for parental legal 
status. The adults’ willingness to coparent, and existing relationships between children 
and several adults, are normatively significant facts—as I explain below—that don’t 
necessarily apply to the kind of multiparenting that would be a legitimate response to 
the imperative need to downscale the population.
Nevertheless, some of the good-making features of previously analyzed cases of 
multiparenting apply to the large-scale, by-design multiparenting that I consider here. 
These features have to do with how multiparenting can serve children’s interests, its 
potential to address morally objectionable monopolies of care in child-rearing, and the 
24 Daniela Cutas, “On Triparenting: Is Having Three Committed Parents Better Than Having Only 
Two?” Journal of Medical Ethics 37, no. 12 (2001): 735–38; Bill Cameron and Samantha Brennan, 
“How Many Parents Can a Child Have? Philosophical Reflections on the Three Parent Case,” Dialogue 
54, no. 1 (2015): 45–61.
25 Cutas, “On Triparenting.” Cameron and Brennan discuss some Canadian cases in detail in “How Many 
Parents.”
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way in which it satisfies adults’ interest in an opportunity to rear children. I argue that 
multiparenting is a fair solution to the question of how to satisfy everybody’s interest in 
an opportunity to rear children in conditions of increasing scarcity (but, as an aside, also 
in more regular circumstances).
First, as Daniela Cutas, Bill Cameron, and Samantha Brennan have noted,26 having three 
or four parents is likely to be, in some important respects, better for children than having 
only two parents, much in the same way having two parents is better than having only 
one: with more committed adults in one’s life, resources such as time, affection, and 
money multiply. Moreover, more parents means more security against the loss of one (or, 
in case of multiparenting, more) of them. And, when it comes to children conceived with 
the help or new reproductive technologies, multiparenting can be a good way of allowing 
children to enter and maintain close relationships with all biological parents (genetic 
and gestational) without thereby excluding the intending parents’ stable partners from 
parenthood.27 In other ways, more parents can make children worse off—again, in the 
same way in which having two parents can make the child worse off than having only 
one—as Cutas notes, by exposing children to higher risk of loss. There is also a worry 
that several involved parents means more potential for conflict, disagreement, and stalled 
decision making—although, on the brighter side, more than two people may also result 
in better decision-making, at least as long as all parents involved are willing to cooperate 
in serving the well-being of the child.28 In previous work,29 I have argued that having 
more than two adults closely involved in a child’s life tends to be especially beneficial 
for those children who would otherwise be among the worst off in terms of access to 
good parenting. Exposure to different styles of caregiving can help correct the effects of 
more minor failings of care. Moreover, empirical research confirms that frequent and 
stable interaction with several caring adults is good for children’s behavior and general 
resilience.30 This could be, in part, because it improves the likelihood that all children 
26 See Gheaus, “Could There Ever Be a Duty.”
27 Cutas, “On Triparenting,” too makes this point. The importance of this consideration depends on the 
importance, for a child, of having relationships with her biological parents—a very contentious issue in 
itself.
28 As noted by Cutas in “On Triparenting.”
29 Anca Gheaus, “Arguments for Nonparental Care for Children,” Social Theory and Practice 37, no. 
3 (2011): 483–509; and “Children’s Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority over Children,” Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 35, no. S1 (2018): 60–75.
30 Michael E. Lamb, “Effects of Nonparental Child Care on Child Development: An Update,” Canadian 
Journal of Psychiatry 41, no. 6 (1996): 330–42; Carrie Rishel, Esther Sales, and Gary F. Koeske, 
“Relationships with Non-Parental Adults and Child Behavior,” Child and Adolescent Social Work 
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have at least one competent caring adult in their lives.31 All things considered, then, 
multiparenting seems a lot more likely to serve, rather than detract from, children’s well-
being.
Second, and independently from how multiparenting could further children’s interest 
in well-being, it has the virtue of undermining the existing monopoly of power that 
parents have over their children. In Protecting the Vulnerable, Robert Goodin has 
provided an account of objectionable dependency at the center of which is the risk 
of abusing power over the dependent.32 This risk, rather than dependency as such, is 
intrinsically objectionable. As long as parents can exclude other caring, beneficial adults 
from their children’s lives, the parent-child relationship exhibits the combination of four 
features that, together, makes children’s dependency on their rearers objectionable: the 
relationship is asymmetrical in terms of parties’ power over each other. Children, as 
the dependent party, have a vital need for the resources provided by the other party—
which, too, is an unavoidable feature of upbringing. The superordinate party exercises 
discretionary control over those resources. Finally, the relationship in question is the 
only source of such resources for the dependent party.33 Asymmetry of power between 
children and parents, and children’s vital need for care, cannot be eliminated from child-
rearing. Nor can the discretionary nature of child-rearing be abolished: if children are 
to be brought up in intimate relationships, which impose strict limits on monitoring by 
outsiders, some level of discretion in the exercise of child-rearer’s power over children 
is also unavoidable. As I and others have argued,34 the objectionable aspect of children’s 
dependency on their caregivers can be eliminated by multiplying the sources of care for 
children. If, alongside well-being interests, children also have an interest in being reared 
in morally nonobjectionable ways, then we ought to dismantle monopolies of care over 
them.
Journal 22, no. 1 (2005): 19–34.
31 A similar point is made in Cameron and Brennan, “How Many Parents.”
32 Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: Chicago University Press), 1985.
33 This is particularly true, and hence particularly objectionable, in the case of single parents or of 
children who only have one parent who is truly involved in decision-making. But to the extent to which 
a parenting couple can be seen as having a unity of interest the monopolistic feature seems, to a lesser 
extent, also true of parenting couples.
34 Gheaus, “Arguments for Nonparental Care,”  Gheaus, “Children’s Vulnerability,” and Mianna Lotz, 
“The Vulnerable Child,” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children, ed. 
Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder, and Jurgen De Wispelaere (New York: Routledge, 2018), 304-314.
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In past work,35 I explored the possibility of providing all children with robust access to 
nonparental institutional-based caregivers, as well as the possibility of a universalized 
secular form of godparenting, whereby an individual or couple become official 
parental figures willing to stay involved in their godchildren’s life throughout their 
entire childhood. Multiparenting could take the form of the latter, or could involve, in 
addition, closer relationships between all the parents—as is the case with already existing 
multiparenting. Note that in case multiparenting is the only, or the best, feasible way to 
minimize monopolies of care in child-rearing, and if children have a right to be raised 
non-monopolistically, then there is a deontic requirement to embrace some form of 
multiparenting whether or not we also ought to downsize the population. It would take 
a lot more work to argue for such a bold conclusion, but even if multiparenting is not 
morally mandatory as such, its monopoly-reducing feature counts as a reason in its favor.
Third, multiparenting is a fair way of allowing all would-be adequate parents to engage 
in child-rearing in circumstances when the population ought to be steeply reduced. As 
others have argued, raising one child can satisfy the interest in child-rearing.36 Further, 
the interest in parenting, as described by Brighouse and Swift, is amenable to this 
interpretation:37 as such, it doesn’t privilege procreators over nonprocreators and doesn’t 
entail a right of procreators to raise their biological children at the exclusion of others. 
And while Brighouse and Swift’s account rules out child-rearing in large institutions 
such as the orphanage, it doesn’t, as they note, rule out small groups of parents raising 
children together. If, as I have suggested, the core of the interest in parenting lies in an 
interest in associating with children rather than controlling their lives, multiparenting 
appears unproblematically capable of satisfying the interest.38 An interesting question, 
which I will not discuss here, concerns the maximum number of adults that can coparent 
35  Gheaus, “Arguments for Nonparental Care.”
36 Meijers, “Climate Change.” But as I noted above, there may be child-centered reasons for having 
multifamilies in which several adults raise together two children.
37 For this, see also Cameron and Brennan, “How Many Parents.”
38 It is worth noting that one kind of multiparenting, which desegregates some of the of rights and 
responsibilities that are currently bundled together as “parental rights,” qualifies as a fair way of satisfying 
the interest in child-rearing of individuals who are unequally able to raise children, or who simply have 
different child-rearing competencies. (For desegregation of parental rights, see for instance Melanie B. 
Jacobs, “Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize 
Multiple Parents,” Journal of Law and Family Studies 309, no. 9 (2007): 309–39. In particular, this model 
of multiparenting could include adults unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for a child (or 
even responsibility shared with only one other coparent) but who could be what we, under current 
circumstances, might call an “honorary uncle” in a way that is beneficial for the child and for the adult 
alike. If so, this is a general argument for multiparenting.
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a child while retaining the distinctive character of the parenting relationship discussed 
above. The relevant condition for establishing this is that the number of coparents is not 
as high as to prevent intimacy.
When Is Multiparenting Morally Required?
Assuming that we have reached the point where it is imperative to downsize the 
population, there is a wide range of interventions that can be considered before or, 
alongside multiparenting. Educating women and providing (especially poor) individuals 
with free access to contraception has been shown to significantly reduce birth rates. 
And there are good independent moral grounds that support such interventions. Other 
interventions for lowering birth rates by incentivizing, nudging, or persuading people 
to have smaller families have also been advocated,39 and many of them may be indeed 
desirable. The present question, however, is what to do at the point when reducing family 
size to one or two children is not enough to reach a sustainable population. Particularly 
relevant here is the question of what to do when it is impossible to reach a sustainable 
population size if all would-be adequate parents (or couples) have only one child.40 But 
it is possible for multiparenting to be morally required for the sake of downsizing the 
population in less extreme cases: that is, if being part of an entire generation of single 
children, can, for whatever reason, seriously set back the well-being interests of the 
individuals in that generation.
One possibility in such cases would be to have an equal lottery decide who may, and who 
may not, engage in procreation and child-rearing. Another option is to create policies 
that incentivize individuals to forgo parenting in the reasonable hope that those people 
who become parents for frivolous reasons can be easily dissuaded from parenting. Yes, 
as I noted above, assuming that multiparenting is in children’s interest and can satisfy the 
adults’ interest in being child-rearers, both lotteries and incentives, nudges, or message 
campaigns are suboptimal. It would be illegitimate to demand that some would-be 
adequate parents abstain from parenting if we can instead find a child-rearing scheme 
that allows all of them to parent. Even dissuading some would-be adequate parents 
would wrong them. Perhaps it is true that many, possibly even most, individuals decide 
39 See Hickey, Rieder, and Earl, “Population Engineering.”
40 There is a worry that such a drastically steep reduction in the population may entail very serious harm, 
especially for the transitional generations. Bad as such harm—and the rights-violations it would surely 
entail in societies that fail at distributive justice—may be, the harm of failing to reduce the population 
could be even greater. I must bracket, for the purpose of this paper, this very complex question. But I am 
thankful to a referee for flagging it to me.
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to have children for frivolous reasons,41 which may in itself be morally objectionable. But, 
to establish the moral desirability of becoming a parent, what matters most is whether 
child-rearing really will make a very significant and nonsubstitutable contribution to 
the flourishing of the individuals in question. And this turns not on their reasons for 
procreating, but on their ability to discharge well their fiduciary parental duties, and 
to enjoy the goods of parenting. On this view, people motivated to have children for 
misguided reasons, but who would nevertheless would parent well, are wronged by 
policies that intentionally dissuade them from parenting.
To conclude, multiparenting is morally desirable, and can be a morally required reform, 
at least in conditions in which it is imperative to quickly scale down the number of 
people brought into existence and doing so is incompatible with all adequate parents 
(or couples) raising a child by themselves.42 It is a separate question, however, whether 
legitimate ways of implementing such a reform exist.
The Difficulties of Multiparenting
Especially if proposed as a legally required default way of raising children, multiparenting 
would surely raise many objections. Before concluding, I note a few that appear most 
obvious, and note the limits of my proposal—the most important of which being that I do 
not address implementation issues. Like many other reforms, one way of implementing 
multiparenting would be via “soft” measures—that is, by incentivizing would-be parents 
to set up multiparenting arrangements. I take these to be less objectionable than making 
multiparenting legally required. 
An immediate worry is that multiparenting would significantly dilute authority over 
children, or else (if it involves the disaggregation of parental rights) would relegate 
different sorts of authority and responsibility to different parents. Many people who 
want to raise children would find this unappealing, and hence strongly object to being 
legally required to multiparent. I said a few words in defense of the view that we ought 
to value child-rearing not primarily because parents have the authority to decide on the 
conditions of their children’s outer life—what kind of education they receive, or when 
41 Overall, in Why Have Children?, lists a large number of bad, yet very popular, reasons to have children.
42 Another important complication that I cannot address here is whether multiparenting is morally 
required uniformly of all prospective parents worldwide or whether more of its burdens ought to be 
carried by people rearing children in countries that are (historically) high consumers. To answer this, 
one needs to first establish what constitutes a just distribution of the costs of minimizing the harm of 
climate change.
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they go to bed—but because they can exert over the child’s inner life the influence that 
any loving adult who is a constant presence during a child’s childhood can have. Yet 
there is a widespread belief that prospective parents seek more than that: namely, they 
prefer a more extensive level of authority over the child that they can exercise alone or 
together with their chosen romantic partner, and to the exclusion of all others. But even 
under normal circumstances, there are good reasons against acting on such preferences, 
if and to the extent to which doing so is suboptimal for children.43 In the context under 
consideration, bringing enough children into the world, such that everybody can parent 
one, will, by stipulation, make it impossible for at least some people in the next generation 
to engage in permissible procreation and parenting. Therefore, even if the adults’ acting 
on their preference for traditional, nuclear parenting, and for a power to exclude all 
others, could serve the overall interest of children in other circumstances, in the case 
at hand they conflict with the children’s future interest in permissibly parenting their 
own children. Therefore, the fact that multiparenting could go against many—or most—
prospective parents’ preferences is not in itself a reason not to seek its implementation in 
those circumstances when it is a morally required reform.
The more substantial worries concerning the implementation of such a reform concern 
(1) the availability of implementation means that do not violate adults’ rights to bodily 
integrity and (2) the likely negative impact on the interests of children. On the first count, 
as in the case of other reforms that seek to restrict parental freedoms, and which are in 
principle justified—such as policies aiming to establish a parental licensing scheme—
it is difficult to identify a permissible way to deal with noncompliers. It would be 
objectionable to try to prevent excessive procreation by forced sterilization or abortion. 
But once procreation does take place, all existing children are owed parents.
Even if adults were to comply with very strict requirements on procreation, and  engaged 
in multiparenting but only very reluctantly, the effects on children may be bad. The 
already existing cases of multiparenting involve adults who very much desire to raise 
together a child, and who, in most situations, have already formed a strong bond with 
the child. Making multiparenting legal in those cases is a matter of merely recognizing 
a new form of family rather than enforcing, or even nudging people into, such a child-
rearing model. If not embraced only reluctantly, multiparenting may or may not work 
well for children, and one way of not working is by failing to secure enough cooperation 
43 In general, by child-centered accounts of child-rearing as well as by dual-interest accounts, such as 
Brighouse and Swift’s, which let the adults’ interests play a justificatory role only to the extent to which 
they are anchored in the child’s own interest—such as the interest of serving the child. See Brighouse and 
Swift, Family Values, and Gheaus, “Is There a Right to Parent?”
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between coparents. Therefore, generalized multiparenting would require a change in 
ethos consisting of would-be parents’ willingness to commit to long-term cooperation 
with other adults, cooperation that would require more coordination and put more limits 
on parents’ authority over their children than it is the case with parenting by couples or 
single-parent families.
These worries, however, need not be fatal to attempts to implement a multiparenting 
reform, which could take various shapes: several adults identifying each other as potential 
coparents, or else children being assigned “secondary parents,” or secular “godparents” 
who are entitled to spend time caring for the child regularly. Some arrangements may be 
more successful than others in securing compliance. Legitimate implementation of any 
particular multiparenting policy should be constrained by the well-being of the children 
and involve a fine balancing of the different interests at stake, including children’s interest 
in accessing various resources and their need for stability. Finally, another reason for 
optimism is that multiparenting can also serve some important interests of coparents, by 
increasing their material and time resources, and therefore their autonomy. The ability to 
divide the work of parenting with more than one other adult is in itself a great advantage 
that can make a legal reform easier.44
Conclusion
Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of child-rearing, I have argued that people 
who would make adequate parents have a powerful moral interest in raising at least a 
child, and that the most substantial part of that interest can be realized in long-term re-
lationship with the child, even if a few other adults have a similar relationship with that 
child. Moreover, the interest can be realized even if one is not the main decision-maker 
concerning how the child’s life goes. Further, I argued that multiparenting, understood 
as three or four adults bringing up a child, is the fair way to enable all adults to fulfill their 
interest in raising children if it is impossible for everybody to parent as a single parent or 
as part of a couple without compromising sustainability. At the same time, I drew on sev-
eral independent arguments to explain why multiparenting is attractive by appealing to 
children’s interest in well-being and to the importance of minimizing monopolies of care 
in children’s lives. I believe that, together, these arguments support the conclusion that 
multiparenting is desirable as soon as justice demands the reduction of the population, 
and can become morally required under conditions of extreme scarcity. Since legitimate 
implementation largely depends on people’s willingness to embrace such a reform, it is 
worthwhile to start considering its merits closely. 
44 See Gheaus, “Arguments for Nonparental Care”; and Cameron and Brennan, “How Many Parents.”
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